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INTRODUCTION
On October 1, 2011, California’s Criminal Justice
Realignment Act became law. It was designed to solve many
of the State of California’s ills. 1 Of primary concern was
cutting costs for the budget-strapped state prison system. 2
Additionally, the State needed to reduce its prison population
because the Supreme Court of the United States found that
California’s prison overcrowding prevented adequate medical
care for inmates and therefore violated the United States
Constitution. 3
The Realignment Act requires ongoing efforts to
effectuate its intended purposes. 4 The Realignment strategy
turns primarily on the location of the incarceration of certain
inmates. 5
Realignment also transfers substantial postconviction custodial and supervision responsibilities to the
jurisdiction that sentenced the inmate, whereas in the past
the State accepted all felon convicts into state prison. 6
Hypothetically, Realignment thereby realizes adequate cost
savings and compliance with the order to reduce population. 7
Data presented in this article will demonstrate that
Realignment has not yet been implemented to its desired
effect. 8 Data will also show that Realignment is being
implemented inconsistently across the state. 9 While the
reason for these deficiencies is not specifically known, this
article explores how the habits and thought process of court
1. BARRY KRISBERG & ELEANOR TAYLOR-NICHOLSON, REALIGNMENT: A
BOLD NEW ERA IN CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS 2 (Sept. 2011), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/REALIGNMENT_FINAL9.28.11.pdf.
2. Id. at 3.
3. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1933 (2011), stay denied, 134 S. Ct. 1
(2013).
4. The Legislature continued to enact provisions in “clean up” legislation
since the original AB 109. See, e.g., A.B. 117, 2011–2012 Sess. (2011).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h) (2011).
6. Fact Sheet, Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 2011 Public Safety
Realignment (Dec. 19, 2013), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/
docs/Realignment-Fact-Sheet.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
7. Id.
8. See infra Figure 1 and associated text.
9. See infra Figure 2 and associated text.
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officers are roadblocks to successful programmatic
execution. 10 These challenges emanate both from a thirtyyear period of cultural development regarding punishment
and also from the role of parties in the criminal justice
system. 11 Much of the information and insight presented in
this article on the plea bargaining and sentencing processes
was obtained by the judge-author through his experience as a
judicial officer and previously as a criminal defense attorney.
The Honorable Philip H. Pennypacker has presided over
criminal cases for ten years on the bench of the Superior
Court of California, County of Santa Clara. He was the
supervising judge of the Criminal Division when the
Realignment Act was passed. Before that, he practiced
criminal law for thirty-one years.
The first section of this article will explain Realignment,
its history, and its purposes, including cost-savings and
population reduction. Data will show how the population of
California’s prisons has changed in the past few years, thanks
to Realignment. Additionally, some important facets of
Realignment will be introduced in this section, specifically
post-release community supervision, split sentencing, and reentry services.
The second section of this article will discuss plea
bargaining, the vehicle through which most criminal
convictions occur. The plea bargaining process has some
fundamental features that work against Realignment’s goals.
Data will demonstrate the inconsistency with which split
sentencing is implemented statewide, perhaps due to these
inherent features.
The topic of the third section is evidence-based
sentencing practices, which is a relatively new philosophy
that was included by the Legislature as a tenet of
Realignment. The practices are to be used by courts both in
10. See infra Parts III.A–III.B.
11. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 1004 (E.D. & N.D.
Cal. 2009).
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initial sentencings and in revocation hearings for any form
post-conviction supervision (commonly thought of as parole
and probation). 12 Transitioning to new principals may be
difficult to both bench officers and attorneys involved in the
system. 13 Similar to the situation with plea bargaining, the
pre-existing sentencing culture is somewhat incompatible
with the use of evidence-based practices. 14
In the fourth section, the authors review the abovementioned challenges in the specific context of supervision
revocation.
Finally, the paper offers suggestions and conclusions
regarding how and whether the State can reach the goals
established in conjunction with Realignment.
I. THE HISTORY BEHIND REALIGNMENT
The impetus for enacting the Criminal Justice
Realignment Act of 2011 boils down to two concurrent
problems facing the State, both the result of significant prison
overcrowding. California’s thirty-three in-state, adult prison
facilities were designed to accommodate approximately
80,000 individuals. 15 By 2006, the population in these thirtythree facilities had grown to 163,500 inmates, an astonishing
202% of design capacity. 16
Economics and constitutional concerns required
California to reduce its prison population. The massive
prison overcrowding put significant strain on California’s
budget, forcing the Governor’s Office and the Legislature to
take action. 17 Both branches recognized that with the
reduction of prison population, a natural diminution of
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(4).
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See infra Part III.C.
15. Court-Ordered Targets for CDCR Inmate Population Reduction, CAL.
DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/3jp-chart.html
[hereinafter Court-Ordered Targets].
16. Id.
17. Coleman, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 912 (this opinion combines the separately
brought actions of Coleman v. Brown and Plata v. Brown).
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economic support would follow. Simultaneously, pending
federal cases against the State regarding its prison system
had taken on gargantuan proportions. 18 To resolve both
issues at the same time, the California Legislature passed the
Realignment Act.
A. The Federal Cases
Initially, two separate cases were filed in federal court in
Sacramento challenging conditions in the California State
Prison System. 19 The first case, Coleman v. Brown, was filed
in 1990 and challenged the treatment of prisoners with
mental disorders. 20 A second case, Plata v. Brown, filed in
2001, concerned the availability of adequate medical care. 21
Common between both cases were independent reviews
pointing to the fact that overcrowding caused increased
chances of infection and other health problems, and
exacerbated issues of the mentally ill. 22
Overcrowding
strained the attention health care professionals could give to
people in need. 23
When left to neglect, all conditions
24
worsened.
Each case went along on its own for several
years until the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit consolidated
Coleman and Plata so that three-judge panel could commence
a hearing and manage the oversight of orders to remediate
the overcrowding. 25
In their briefs for the consolidated case, the plaintiffs
argued that harmful overcrowding conditions violated the
Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. The plaintiffs presented overwhelming evidence
that overcrowding was causing avoidable medical and mental
18. Id. at 888.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 897–98.
21. Id. at 890–92 (describing the claim brought by plaintiffs in Plata v.
Brown).
22. See id. at 887, 909.
23. Id. at 909.
24. Id. at 895.
25. Coleman v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013).
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health issues. 26 The judges agreed and found that the system
was on the verge of collapse or implosion. 27 Because of the
overcrowding,
systematic
institutional
incompetence
prevailed in the attention to both medical and mental health
issues. 28
Solutions implemented while the cases were
pending were inadequate due to the flood of prisoners coming
into the system, and the miniscule flow of those leaving.29
Those solutions included building new health facilities that
directly addressed medical and mental health issues, as well
as placing inmates out of state. 30
Ultimately, the three-judge panel ordered the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to
reduce the population of its thirty-three prison facilities to
110,000 inmates (still 137.5% of design capacity) by June 27,
2013. 31 This level of reduction required the State to disgorge
between 38,000 and 46,000 prisoners or face contempt. No
direction was imposed on the state on how to meet this goal;
rather, the court deferred to the State’s best judgment. 32
The consolidated cases eventually found their way to the
Supreme Court of the United States under the name Brown v.
Plata, where Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the
majority, took on two difficult issues. 33 The first was the
reach of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. 34 This act
was designed to truncate prison litigation stemming from any
prison housing condition. 35 Under the act, findings regarding
the systematic nature of the alleged violations are necessary,
and rulings must meet the “clear and convincing” evidence
26. Coleman, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 950.
27. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1927–28.
28. See Coleman, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 963.
29. Id. at 914–16.
30. Id. at 903–04, 958–59.
31. Id. at 1003.
32. Id. at 1003–04.
33. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1997).
35. See William C. Collins, Bumps in the Road to the Courthouse: The
Supreme Court and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 24 PACE L. REV. 651, 667
(2004).
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standard. 36 Further, the Act requires that intermediate steps
should be explored and tried before an order as drastic as
reduction is entered. After receiving fourteen days of expert
testimony, reports from receivers and monitors, and actual
case histories, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment of
the Constitution barring cruel and unusual punishment was
an important ingredient in evaluating the claims under this
Act. 37
The second issue was the order of the three-judge court,
which Justice Kennedy affirmed with little difficulty since the
lower court’s record was replete with instances of failed
medical attention, suicides, and squalid, unlivable
conditions. 38 Justice Kennedy’s opinion is stocked with
examples, pictures, and anecdotal information proven at the
trial court level. 39 Thus, the burden of fashioning a remedy
fell back on the shoulders of the State. 40
B. The Economic Status of the State of California
While the federal cases were pending, California was on
the verge of an economic meltdown, much like the rest of the
country. 41 Income to the State of California had fallen,
services were in question, and the structure of the State’s
financial well-being was in doubt. 42 Furthermore, even
without an economic crisis, the costs of incarceration were
and still are staggering. 43 Each prisoner costs the state of
California, on average, $45,006 per year. 44 Reducing the

36. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1929; 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E).
37. Plata, 131 S. Ct at 1929.
38. Id. at 1949.
39. Id. at 1935, 1949–50.
40. Id. at 1947.
41. Taylor Chase-Wagniere, Note, The Perfect Storm: Brown v. Plata and
California’s Financial Crisis, 22 CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 345, 358–59 (2013).
42. See id.
43. See id. at 359.
44. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CORRECTIONS: YEAR AT A GLANCE 10
(Fall
2011),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/2011_
Annual_Report_FINAL.pdf. This figure has been adjusted upward based on
information from the Department of Finance. Joan Petersilia, Voices from the
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population by 40,000 inmates (per the above-mentioned court
order) thus saves the state upwards of $1.8 billion annually.
Additionally, the Legislature had attempted an intermediate
solution of stemming the flow of new prisoners by way of
offering subvention monies to the counties in SB 678, and the
report generated by the Administrative Office of the Courts
indicated that the costs of incarceration had gone up 300%
since 1990-2012. Leaving aside the costs of education and
other comparative services, the taxpayers have not been
getting a value-added return on their tax dollar investment. 45
The fiscal condition of the State did not go unnoticed in
the federal cases. Indeed, Justice Kennedy noted in his
opinion:
“The court cannot ignore the political and fiscal reality
behind this case. California’s Legislature has not been
willing or able to allocate the resources necessary to meet
this crisis absent a reduction in overcrowding. There is
not reason to believe it will begin to do so now, when the
State of California is facing an unprecedented budgetary
shortfall.” 46

California’s longstanding aggressive incarceration policy
only exacerbated the budget problem. In the thirty years
preceding these cases, the State of California built an
unprecedented number of prisons to keep pace with a growing
inmate population, spurred by Legislative enactments which
required the placement of people in prison with no
consideration for probation. 47 Moreover, various initiatives
had been passed by the voters which increased prison
Field: How California Stakeholders View Criminal Justice Realignment 41
(Stanford Crim. Just. Ctr., Working Paper 2013), available at http://www.law.
stanford.edu/publications/voices-from-the-field-how-california-stakeholdersview-public-safety-realignment.
45. See generally CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANY, THE PRICE OF
PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS (2012), available at http://
www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Price_of_Prisons_updated_
version_072512.pdf.
46. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1939.
47. Andrew M. Ducart, Go Directly to Jail: How Misaligned Subsidies
Undermine California’s Prisoner Realignment Goal and What is Possible to
Maximize the Law’s Potential, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 481, 486–87 (2013).
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sentences, such at the “Three Strikes and You Are Out” law,
which carried a minimum sentence on the Third Strike of
twenty-five years to life, even for a new, non-violent, nonserious offense. 48
Furthermore, as noted in the Plata decision, once
released, the parole agents were in a process of incarcerating
a high number of parole violators, which in turn, cost the
state money either to house the person in prison, or on
separate, very expensive contracts with local county jails. 49
For example, contracts with both Sacramento and Alameda
counties were in excess of $15 million per year. 50 Prisoners
returned on parole violations had very few services to provide
a safety net to them, and because of their cultural,
institutional, and criminal outlook, few had an incentive to
become involved in any services offered by the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 51
C. The Initial Experiment: S.B. 678
While the litigation in Plata was pending, the Legislature
enacted Senate Bill (S.B.) 678 otherwise known as the
California Corrections Performance Incentives Act of 2009. 52
The goal of this legislation was to reduce prison population
and save money in the State’s General Fund. 53 Without
compromising public safety, incentives (in the form of
economic assistance to the counties) were to be passed on to
counties who had shown a reduction in the number of state
prison commitments from a base year. 54 The specific target
was to reduce the number of persons committed to prison for
probation violations. 55 Funds secured from S.B. 678 went to
48. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b)–(i), 1170.12.
49. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1943.
50. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 95–96.
51. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1943, 1954.
52. California Corrections Performance Incentives Act of 2009, S.B. 678,
2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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hiring more probation officers to more closely monitor clients,
securing of risk/needs assessment instruments, contracting
for cognitive behavior therapy programs, and training on the
new methods to be utilized in the system. 56
County-level probation departments were to adopt and
implement programs, derived from evidence-based practices,
which assessed individuals in terms of “risks” and “needs”
and placed them in programs accordingly with the end goal of
reducing both prison commitments and recidivism. 57
Evidence-based practices, which will be explained more
thoroughly in the third section of this article, are defined
statutorily as “supervision policies, procedures, programs,
and practices demonstrated by scientific research to reduce
recidivism among individuals under probation, parole or postrelease supervision.” 58
In a report issued in April 2013, the Administrative
Office of the Courts noted both successes and failures of this
Act. 59 It noted that the first three-year cycle of the program
saved the State approximately $500,000,000. 60 Counties
received approximately $130,000,000 in re-investment
money. 61 The report did note, however, that not all of the
probation
departments
had
enacted
evidence-based
practices. 62 Further, the amount of money needed to fully
implement the process was lacking in certain areas. 63
In 2009, this was a bold experiment advanced by persons
who had studied this area of corrections and public policy.64
56. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, REPORT ON THE CALIFORNIA
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES ACT OF 2009 16 (2013),
available at http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/AOC_SB-678-April2013.pdf [hereinafter REPORT].
57. Id.
58. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1229(d).
59. See generally REPORT, supra note 56.
60. Id. at 1.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 14.
63. Id. at 38.
64. Jessica Feinstein, Reforming Adult Felony Probation to Ease Prison
Overcrowding: An Overview of S.B. 678, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 375, 396 (2011).
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The stark financial issues facing continued growth of a prison
population were not lost on the drafters of this legislation. 65
The most shocking figure was that during the twenty-year
period, from 1991 to the date of enactment, the original
prison budget of $9.8 billion and had grown at a rate of
300%. 66 Such drastic inflation of the budget required serious
innovation on behalf of the legislators. 67
D. Stage Set for the Criminal Realignment Act
With the fiscal crisis and federal cases coming to a head,
and a functional but inadequate preliminary solution in S.B.
678, the Legislature drafted the Criminal Realignment Act as
a grand scheme to solve many problems and provide overall
improvement the state system of incarceration.
II. WHAT IS REALIGNMENT?
The Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 created a
number of structural changes to the face of the criminal
justice system, yet the act was passed with little formal input
from criminal justice participants. 68 The Legislature provided
adequate time for local agencies to prepare for the changes
associated with Realignment. 69
Unfortunately, the
Realignment Act has failed thus far to reduce prison
population sufficiently to comply with the court order. 70
A. The Structure of Realignment
The Legislature expressed the overarching principals of
Realignment via findings in California Penal Code sections
65. Id. at 397–98.
66. Id. at 397.
67. Id.
68. Steven Thomas Fazzi, A Primer on the 2011 Correction Realignment:
Why California Placed Felons under County Control, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 423,
427–28 (2013); Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails,
Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 184 (2013) (noting
that the only parties excluded from meetings regarding the Act were prisoners
and prisoner advocates).
69. Stats. 2011, c. 15.
70. See Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 1.
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17.5 and 3450. An overview of those findings is critical to
understanding of the direction of the Act. In these findings,
the Legislature recommitted itself to reducing recidivism and
protecting public safety. 71
The Legislature found that
building more prisons has not guaranteed a safer state. 72
Also, the Legislature highlighted “low-level” felony offenders
for housing in the county of their conviction. 73 Furthermore,
the Legislature agreed to “reinvest” in counties for their
commitment to the program. 74 The Legislature likewise
required the establishment of a Community Corrections
Partnership in each county to oversee and structurally
implement the goals of Realignment locally. 75 Finally, the
Legislature required the use of evidence-based practices in
furthering the reintegration of the convicted felons back into
society. 76 Thus, the Realignment Act encompassed several
important features which each deserve their own discussion.
1. Accumulation of Legislation
Firstly, after the Act was passed it was vetted by
criminal justice practitioners and was found to have several
drafting problems. 77 Those were addressed immediately with
emergency legislation passed by the Legislature (AB 116, AB
117, ABX 117, and SB 1023). 78 This “clean-up” legislation
made the Act more understandable and internally
consistent. 79

71. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(1).
72. Id. § 17.5(a)(3).
73. Id. § 17.5(a)(5).
74. Id. § 17.5(a)(7).
75. Id. §§ 17.5(a)(6), 1230(b)(2).
76. Id. §§ 17.5(a)(5), 3450.
77. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 15.
78. Id. at 36.
79. For example, the original legislation omitted the method and procedure
for the revocation of mandatory supervision. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(5)(B).
The “clean up” legislation remedied this, and was resolved ultimately in S.B.
1023. S.B. 1023, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
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2. Local Custody for Low-Level Offenders
The Realignment Act ordered “low level” felony offenders
to be housed locally by counties, as opposed to traditionally
sending the offenders to state prison at the State’s expense. 80
Realignment excluded from its reach three groups of inmates:
(1) persons with a present or prior conviction of a violent or
serious offenses (Penal Code Sections 667.5(c) and 1192.7(c));
(2) persons subject to offenses—either presently or in the
past—where registration under Penal Code Section 290 was
required (commonly known as “sex offender registration”);
and (3) persons who have committed aggravated white collar
offenses under Penal Code Section 186.11. 81
Under
Realignment, these three groups of persons still serve their
sentence in State prison. 82
However, approximately 500 felony offenses exist outside
the three groups listed above, and have been deemed to be
within the scope of “low-level” offenders. 83 Most of the lowlevel offenses have a potential sentence of sixteen months,
two years, or three years in state prison. 84 There are some
deviations to that scheme, but by and large, this is the group
targeted by the Legislature. 85 These low-level offenders
historically served their time in state prison, but Realignment
transferred the burden of their care and incarceration back to
the county where they were sentenced. 86 The burden is
significant, and the State’s original projections placed an
additional 25,469 inmates plus 29,549 post-release
community supervisees on counties statewide. 87
Under
80. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(5).
81. Id. §§ 17.5(a)(5), 1170(h)(3).
82. Id. § 1170(h)(3).
83. J. RICHARD COUZENS, FELONY SENTENCING AFTER REALIGNMENT 94
(2013), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/felony_
sentencing.pdf.
84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(1).
85. For example, a crime in furtherance of a street gang is not automatically
a state prison offense. Id. § 182.5.
86. Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 1.
87. Funding and Projected Inmate Caseload, CALREALIGNMENT.ORG (2012),
http://calrealignment.org/county-implementation.html.
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California law, there is a status enhancement carrying a oneyear consecutive sentence for any person who had served a
prior prison term. The Realignment Act modified this
provision so that serving time for one of these 500 felony
offenses in a local jail still counts as a “prison prior” for
purposes of a one-year status enhancement under California
Penal Code section 667.5(b)(1) on future convictions. 88 In
short, the Realignment Act changed the location where the
sentence is served, but not the ultimate stigma of the offense.
3. Split Sentencing
One of the innovative features of Realignment gives the
sentencing court discretion in determining how the sentence
is served. 89
Penal Code Sections 1170(h)(5)(A) and
1170(h)(5)(B) permit a low-level sentence to be served in one
of two fashions. The first option is to commit the person to
the county jail for the entire term of the sentence. 90 If that is
done, Realignment provides no period of parole after the
service of the term (contrary to the pre-Realignment
system). 91 The second option is to “split” or “blend” the
sentence, so that part of the time is served in custody, and
part of the time is a period of “mandatory supervision” which
has conditions similar to a probation sentence and is
administered by the local probation office. 92
Split sentencing is valuable because it allows probation
to connect early with individuals in the system. 93 Instead of
sitting in jail, people on supervision receive case management
services to help them re-enter the community with a greater
chance of success (maintaining public safety and reducing
recidivism). 94
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(d).
Id. § 1170(h)(5)(A)–(B).
Id. § 1170(h)(5)(A).
COUZENS, supra note 83, at 10.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(5)(B).
COUZENS, supra note 83, at 11.
Ducart, supra note 47, at 493.
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Despite the benefits of split sentencing, the data does not
demonstrate sufficient employment of this new sentencing
opportunity. Of all the felony sentences pronounced since
Realignment’s inception, approximately fifty percent of them
were served locally and therefore also eligible to be split
between custody and mandatory supervision 95 (See Figure 1,
below). However, of all of those felony sentences served
locally, as of June 2012, only 26% of them (statewide) were
split to include mandatory supervision. 96 Application of split
sentencing is erratic at best. (See Figure 2). For example,
eligible sentences in Stanislaus County are split 86% of the
time 97 whereas eligible sentences in Los Angeles County 98 are
split only 6% of the time. 99 Unfortunately, a slow rate of
adoption appears to be the norm; of California’s fifty-eight
counties, only approximately sixteen maintain more than fifty
individuals on mandatory supervision at any given time. 100

95. MIKE MALES, ONE YEAR INTO REALIGNMENT: PROGRESS STALLS,
STRONGER
INCENTIVES
NEEDED
2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.cjcj.org/news/5997; Split Sentencing Dashboard, CHIEF PROB.
OFFICERS OF CAL. (2012),
http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/splitsentencedashboard.swf
[hereinafter Split Sentencing Dashboard].
96. Split Sentencing Dashboard, supra note 95.
97. However, Stanislaus County sends more offenders per capita to prison
than the state average and sends more nonviolent offenders to prison than most
other counties; 60% of the inmates it sends to prison are nonviolent, suggesting
that the remaining convicts left in their custody are lower-level offenders than
in other counties. MALES, supra note 95; Split Sentencing Dashboard, supra
note 95.
98. Split Sentencing Dashboard, supra note 95.
99. In fact, in June 2012, Los Angeles County had only eighteen people
actively on Mandatory Supervision. Id.
100. County Realignment Dashboard, CHIEF PROB. OFFICERS OF CAL. (2013),
http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/dashboard_county.swf.
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Figure 1101

101. MALES, supra note 95; Realignment Dashboard, CHIEF PROB. OFFICERS
CAL.
(2013),
http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/dashboard.swf
[hereinafter Realignment Dashboard].
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Figure 2102
4. Post-Release Community Supervision (PRCS) and
Parole
The Realignment Act also restructured the entire concept
of parole. There were several significant changes. First, those
serving time for low-level offenses, who were or would be
released from a prison sentence on the date of the Act’s
inception, were then and are now placed on post-release
community supervision (PRCS) instead of parole. 103 PRCS
and parole are similar in the way that they are both
supervised, out-of-custody agreements with requirements and
restrictions on the released person. 104 However, PRCS is
administered through the local probation departments
whereas parole is administered by the State by the
Department of Parole Administration. 105 Any revocation of
102.
103.
104.
105.
(2013),

Split Sentencing Dashboard, supra note 95.
COUZENS, supra note 83, at 56.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3541.
Post-Release (County Level) Supervision, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/Post-Release-Community-
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this status was to be handled by the Superior Courts. 106
Second, as a delayed aspect of Realignment, on July 1,
2013, the entire parole revocation process shifted from a State
administrative agency to the local Superior Courts. 107 Several
classes of individuals remained subject to parole supervision.
These persons were ones who had been convicted of a violent
or serious offense, a three-strike offense, a special category of
sex offender and the Mentally Disordered Offenders. 108
Accordingly, the processes of revocation for paroled and
PRCS individuals are new areas for local court systems. The
resulting added caseload for counties is significant. In the
first year following Realignment, the state released 36,329
individuals on PCRS. 109 Sixty-four percent have been able to
complete PRCS successfully with no returns to custody,
meaning that approximately one in three individuals on
PRCS will violate their terms and need to be dealt with by
counties. 110
Additionally, approximately ten percent of
individuals on PRCS so far have warrants for failure to
appear. 111
The impact of the new caseloads on the superior courts,
probation departments and jails is significant. Superior
courts had to appoint hearing officers to adjudicate the
revocations. 112 Calendars and staffing for the calendars had to
be accomplished. Coordination with the county jails had to be
maintained. Protocols for the delivery of the petitions had to
be approved between the agencies. Probation had to hire,
train, and establish new units designed to manage “high risk”
offenders. Parole divisions within the state had to gear up to
do hearings in a courtroom setting rather than by

Supervision.html.
106. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3450 et seq.
107. Id. § 3000.08.
108. Id.
109. Realignment Dashboard, supra note 101.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. CAL. GOV. CODE § 71622.5.
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administrative hearings. County jails had to experience and
still experience an expansion of the capacities in the local
jurisdictions.
5. Evidence-Based Practices
According to the mandate of the Realignment Act,
evidence-based practices are essential to, and required in, the
sentencing and supervision revocation processes. 113 An entire
subsequent section of this article is dedicated to explaining, in
a summary fashion, evidence-based practices. However, to
think about them simply, consider that judges, lawyers, and
probation departments take into account many more facts
and assumptions about a defendant during the sentencing
process in order to decide the appropriate sentence (and also
whether to subsequently revoke parole or PRCS). Evidencebased practices are a new approach to gathering and
analyzing this information, backed by research, with the
promise of better results so that more fitting outcomes can be
guaranteed. 114 Sentences produced through this method are
more individualized, which is valuable because research has
shown that the nature of the defendant makes a difference as
to whether a particular sentence will help a convicted person
reform and recover or actually make him worse. 115
6. Custody Credits
Finally, the entire method of awarding custody credits,
both at the county jail and state prison level was changed. 116
Certain violent offenders are not subject to this process under
California Penal Code Section 2933.1.
Those offenders
113. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17.5(a)(5), 3450(b)(8).
114. Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta-analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender
Recidivism: What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 575 (1996).
115. Id. at 575, 588, 591.
116. The California Penal Code awards actual custody day toward the
ultimate sentence. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2900.5. The Legislature has tinkered
with California Penal Code section 4019 for years. This section provides that the
inmate “earns” “good time-work time” in excess of the actual days spent in
custody.
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receive only a fifteen percent reduction of their sentences for
“good time-work time”. 117 However, most offenders now
receive credits that translate to the following: for every two
days served, the offender receives an additional two days of
credit. 118 For example, if a low level offender has actually
been in custody for ten days, he has earned twenty days of
credit toward his sentence. This method of advancing credits
was addressed in the Plata decision and was made a part of
the Realignment Act in order to reduce overcrowding. 119
B. Population Reduction Data
Realignment has been in motion for two years as of the
writing of this article. While significant changes to the
criminal justice system are visible, Realignment has not yet
attained its goals. 120
Even before the Act became law, counties anticipatorily
modified their sentencing practices and reduced the number
of convicts they sent to prison. 121 Then, in the first eight
months after Realignment, the prison population decreased
steadily. 122 Between October 2011 and March 2012, felony
commitments to state prison dropped 41% as all counties
implemented the new practices. 123
Prison commitments
dropped by 66% for females and 38% for males. 124 Offenders
between the ages of 35 and 39 were 50% less likely to be sent
117. Id. § 2933.1.
118. Id. § 4019.
119. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1943.
120. California failed to sufficiently reduce its prison population by the June
2013 deadline. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 949 (E.D.
& N.D. Cal. 2009). Furthermore, it is too early to measure recidivism, which is
generally analyzed in a three-year term.
121. Ducart, supra note 47, at 506–07.
122. Monthly Population Report Archive, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB.
(2011 & 2012), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_
Services_Branch/Monthly/Monthly_Tpop1a_Archive.html [hereinafter Monthly
Population Reports].
123. MIKE MALES, UPDATE: EIGHT MONTHS INTO REALIGNMENT: DRAMATIC
REDUCTIONS IN CALIFORNIA PRISONERS 1 (2012),http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports
/docs/External-Reports/Realignment_update_June_19_2012.pdf
[hereinafter
MALES, UPDATE].
124. Id. at 2.
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to prison. 125 Prison commitments for property and drug
crimes dropped 60% and 70% respectively. 126 Six months
after Realignment began, seven major California counties had
reduced their prison commitments by 50% or more. 127

Figure 3128
As of July 31, 2013, the population in the thirty-three
state prison facilities of concern was 119,624. 129 See Figure 3.
Despite a promising start, the state failed to comply with the
June 2013 population target of 110,000. 130 The problem
began with an unexplainable population plateau in July
2012. 131 New felon admissions increased at that point
125. Id. at 4.
126. Id.
127. Counties: Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Kings, Tulare, San Mateo,
Ventura, and San Bernardino. Id. at 5–6.
128. Monthly Population Reports, supra note 122.
129. Court-Ordered Targets, supra note 15.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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roughly 3%. 132 Sentences for simple possession of drugs
(other than marijuana), motor vehicle theft, and burglary
were suddenly and mysteriously more frequent, and
primarily responsible for the increase. 133 The increase was
concentrated in three large counties: Sacramento, San
Bernardino, and Kings, which were responsible for half of the
growth. 134 As of yet, there is no known reason for the
increase. However, the net result is that after nearly two
years of the Realignment Act, prison commitments have
fallen only 36%. 135
III. APPLICATION OF EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES
A primary challenge in the implementation of the
Realignment Act is the requirement that courts and
probation departments utilize evidence-based practices in the
sentencing of low-level offenders. 136 The challenge derives in
large part from the fact that evidence-based practices are a
new method of addressing sentencing, the application of
which requires some training and re-learning by the
professionals involved. 137
A. What are Evidence-Based Practices?
When a defendant is sentenced, and when a decision
needs to be made on whether to revoke the defendant’s
supervision, the courts and probation departments use what
they know about the defendant to arrive at what seems to be
the most appropriate outcome. 138
Until recently, the
traditional analysis used to make these decisions was
132. MALES, UPDATE, supra note 123, at 3–5.
133. Id. at 4.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2.
136. Ducart, supra note 47, at 506; Roger K. Warren, Evidence-based
Sentencing: The Application of Principles of Evidence-based Practice to State
Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 628 (2009).
137. Ducart, supra note 47, at 509–12 (discussing the need to identify the
appropriate factors for a given type of offender and the accurate weight
assigned to said factor for a particular community).
138. Feinstein, supra note 64, at 402; Warren, supra note 136, at 627.
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untested and unproven. 139
Evidence-based practices are the result of research
demonstrating that the best methods of analysis for
determining the most fitting outcome for a particular convict
consider both the nature and needs of the specific defendant,
and the requirement for public safety. 140 The result is a more
individualized sentence than what occurred previously, and
one in which the defendant has a better chance of successful
treatment, if amenable. 141
Evidence-based practices give structure to sentencing
and revocation decisions by assessing defendants in three
primary areas: (1) risk of reoffending; (2) prognostic risks,
which are risks that predict a poorer outcome for a specific
defendant in a standard rehabilitation program; and (3)
criminogenic needs, which refer to clinical disorders and
functional impairments of the defendant that should be
addressed to reduce the risk of further offending. 142 Once
these factors are assessed, most offenders can be categorized
into one of four groups: High Risk / High Needs, High Risk /
Low Needs, Low Risk / High Needs, or Low Risk / Low
Needs. 143 Each category has specific modalities of treatments
to be applied, some of which are completely counter-intuitive
to the analysis previously employed by courts. 144
For
example, a Low Risk / Low Needs offender may be a casual
abuser of substances, not an addict, and have no prior record.
Under the pre-existing system, this person would be ordered
to complete an intense drug treatment program, simply

139. See Ducart, supra note 47, at 509–12.
140. Warren, supra note 136, at 598, 622–23.
141. Joan Petersilia, California’s Correctional Paradox of Excess and
Deprivation, 37 CRIME & JUST. 207, 270–71 (2008).
142. Douglas Marlowe, Evidence Based Analysis for Drug Offenders: An
Analysis of Prognostic Risks and Criminogenic Needs, 1 CHAPMAN J. CRIM.
JUST. 167, 179–81 (2009).
143. Id. at 184–200.
144. Id. at 199. Research shows that low risk, low need offenders may
respond most effectively to the threat of severe punishment because they are
not familiar with punishment and will work to prevent this outcome. Id.
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because that is what the courts were used to doing, had done
in the past, and—without further education—would continue
to do in the future. 145 According to evidence-based practices
she would not do well in a residential treatment program
because she would be exposed to heavy users or addicts, who
tend to have influence over casual users. 146
Much of the research behind evidence-based practices
stems from studies done on persons involved with substance
abuse. 147 Over the past two decades, drug courts, diversion
programs, and other methods of addressing the specific needs
of drug abusers have been established nationwide, providing
abundant relevant data from which helpful conclusions were
drawn. 148 Since at least 80% of incarcerated persons have
substance abuse issues that generally go unaddressed, data
regarding the apposite resources for drug abusers is an
appropriate baseline for research on criminal sentencing in
general. 149
B. Why are Evidence-Based Practices Critical to Realignment?
A profound and meaningful amount of research has gone
into studying this methodology. 150 What comes through
clearly from the scientific research is that when the
assessment is correctly done, and the programmatic steps are
taken, both public safety and reduced recidivism are
realized. 151 Many offenders sentenced under traditional
145. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience.
146. Marlowe, supra note 142, at 198–99.
147. Id. at 198–200.
148. See generally Richard S. Gebelein, Delaware Leads the Nation:
Rehabilitation in a Law and Order Society; A System Responds to Punitive
Rhetoric, 7 DEL. L. REV. 1, 1–22 (2004) (discussing the rise in drug offender
focused programs despite rhetoric suggesting no support for rehabilitation). See
also Marlowe, supra note 142, at 170–76.
149. Marlowe, supra note 142, at 167, 168 n.4.
150. For example, visit the California Courts’ website, which features a
variety of studies and practice guides on the topic of evidence-based practices as
applied to the criminal justice system. Evidence-Based Practice, CAL. COURTS,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/5285.htm.
151. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT 101: SCIENCE
REVEALS NEW TOOLS TO MANAGE OFFENDERS 4 (Sept. 2011), available at
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models are caught in the revolving door of the criminal justice
system. Evidence-based practices seek to discover the source
of the offender’s behavior, and through cognitive behavior
treatment, address the issue so that the offender has less of a
probability to return to the system. 152 While safety and
reduction of recidivism are at the heart of the Realignment
Act, perhaps an even more appealing benefit is that the
overall financial costs to the entire criminal justice system
are reduced because resources can now be more strategically
applied.
However, for evidence-base practices to be successful, a
commitment is required from all partners in the criminal
justice system (including police departments, probation
departments, social services, judges, and lawyers). 153
Furthermore, the evidence-based thought process must start
at arrest and be maintained through the completion of postincarceration release. 154 The old, cookie-cutter method of
sentencing must be replaced by individualized sentencing.
C. Intricacies and Challenges of Implementing EvidenceBased Practices
Several aspects of the evidence-based practices method
prove a difficult adjustment for persons well settled in the old
ways. 155 First, the language used in the entire assessment
process is foreign and, in some cases, counter-intuitive to
many participants in the criminal justice system, including
judges in particular. For example, a person with numerous
substance abuse arrests and mental health issues may be
assessed into the “High Risk” category. 156 A judicial officer
would not instinctively place a “High Risk” offender on

http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2011/Pew_Risk_Assessme
nt_brief.pdf.
152. Id. at 3.
153. Id. at 5.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Marlowe, supra note 142, at 184.
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probation or mandatory supervision because of the negative
and serious public safety connotation of the label. Yet, the
evidence-based practices demonstrate such supervision may
be the best solution. 157 Therefore, the process of educating
and training judicial officers on the language used by the
system is essential.
Second, judicial reluctance to enter into this method of
sentencing is apparent. As recognized by Judge Michael
Marcus of Oregon, many judges believe that defendants
coming into their courts should be punished—“just deserts” 158
meted out and court processes closed—and what follows later
is between the defendant and the post-conviction supervision
authority. 159
Such separation is now proven to be
disadvantageous. 160
Instead, research shows that many
offenders require some form of judicial intervention as a part
of the rehabilitation program. 161 Periodic reviews, status
reports and instant incarceration are needed in some of the
quadrants. 162
Accordingly, the resistance to continued
judicial involvement must be overcome.
Third, there is institutional bias against the application
of evidence-based practices. 163 This bias is not localized to
any one part of the criminal justice system, and extends to
judges and attorneys. It is easy to see evidence-based
practices as a scheme that coddles criminals, and prosecutors,
by and large, have little, if any, interest in a system that is
known for such a thing. 164
Prosecutors may be more
concerned about evenly outcomes among similarly charged
157. Id. at 185.
158. Judge Michael Marcus, Conversations on Evidence-Based Sentencing, 1
CHAPMAN J. CRIM. JUST. 61, 95–98 (2009). “Just deserts” describes a reason for
increasing a sentence simply because of the need to do so and without
cognizance of the individualized needs of a defendant, the cost of incarceration,
and lack of reality as to what will happen thereafter.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 184.
163. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 9.
164. Id. at 131–32.
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defendants, than trying to individualize outcomes, which
would be more consistent with evidence-based practices. 165
This type of “cookie cutter” plea bargaining runs counter to
the need to assess and implement a rehabilitative program
consistent with the assessment. Defense attorneys resist the
system because its cornerstone is garnering as much reliable
and validated information from the defendant as possible at
an early stage of the proceedings. 166 Such disclosure of
personal information is counter to the adversarial nature of
the work done by defense attorneys; very few would ever
allow clients to freely, openly, and truthfully discuss details of
drug abuse, social circles, and family situations. 167 This type
of information is critical in the assessment process but
normally would be stymied, absent a protective order. 168
Finally, the duration of sentences typical of the low-level
offenders targeted by Realignment is not entirely compatible
with what evidence-based practices proscribe for successful
treatment. For example, consider the following hypothetical:
a defendant is charged with possession of methamphetamine
under section 11377a of the California Health and Safety
Code, and has three prison priors. The greatest of three
possible sentence durations for this offense is three years, the
others being sixteen months and two years. 169 The prison
priors, under section 667.5(b) of the California Penal Code
add one year each. 170 The maximum total sentence therefore
is six years in county jail. 171 If the court engaged in
settlement discussions, a typical offer (before Realignment)
would be either sixteen months or two years, with an

165. Id. at 128, 139.
166. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience.
167. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience.
168. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience.
169. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11377(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h).
170. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(b).
171. The greatest possible sentence for the possession of methamphetamine
under these circumstances is three years, plus a one-year enhancement each for
the three prior prison sentences, equaling a total of six years.
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assumed three years of parole. 172 Since Realignment, this
offender would be released after the sixteen months or two
years with no tailing supervision whatsoever. 173 The court
could have split the sentence—granting eight months in
custody and eight months on mandatory supervision—but the
eight-month period of supervision falls short of the minimum
of two years that Dr. Marlowe suggests is needed to address a
defendant’s addiction. 174 If the hypothetical was modified to
have the court impose one year in custody and two on
mandatory supervision, the defense attorney would be
demanding that the sixteen months of straight time go into
effect and would likely not suggest to the client to take the
offer. 175 This case would therefore, likely be at an impasse. If
the court was dedicated to “moving cases” 176, the court might
accede to the defense request (a shorter term, but less
beneficial to the defendant in the long run) in order to resolve
the matter. 177
The success of the Realignment Act is entwined with the
effective use of evidence-based practices. 178 For the process of
evidence-based practices to take full effect, the justice
partners must consistently apply the process. The objectives
of Realignment will not be achieved if any link of the chain is
broken or non-existent. This failure will lead to an increase
in crime and a continual spinning of the revolving door of the
criminal justice system. Realignment only stands a chance if
all branches of the criminal justice system are educated in its
objectives and supporting methodologies. The reality that the

172. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience.
173. COUZENS, supra note 83, at 10.
174. Douglas Marlowe, Presentation at the Cow County Institute: Targeting
Dispositions by Risks and Need (Jun. 20, 2012).
175. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience.
176. People v. Clancey, 299 P.3d 131, 136 (2013).
177. Id.
178. See J. RICHARD COUZENS, EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES: REDUCING
RECIDIVISM TO INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY: A COOPERATIVE EFFORT BY COURTS
AND PROBATION 3 (2011), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/
EVIDENCE-BASED-PRACTICES-Summary-6-27-11.pdf.

PENNYPACKER FINAL

2013]

4/18/2014 7:05 PM

THE REALIGNMENT ACT

State of California is no
incarceration is what
agencies to comply.
community jurisdictions
been created for them.

1019

longer involved in low-level offender
may force local jurisdictions and
Since the defendants are local,
must adapt to the reality which has

IV. PLEA BARGAINING IN THE REALIGNMENT ERA
Plea bargaining is an inextricable part of the criminal
justice system. The term “plea bargaining” describes a
method of promoting settlement of cases without going
through a trial. 179 “To a large extent . . . horse trading
[between prosecutor and defense counsel] determines who
goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is.
It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the
criminal justice system.” 180 As those involved in the system
realize, there are bargains that determine to which counts a
defendant is admitting culpability, and bargains which
control the sentence to be imposed. Plea bargains often lead
the parties and the courts into a blurred area between the
duties of the executive branch (to charge the defendant) and
judiciary (to sentence the defendant). 181 The central thesis of
this section of the article is that plea bargaining, as the courts
and attorneys have come to practice it, must be changed when
the case involves a low-level offender in order to comply with
evidence based practices. Traditional plea bargaining rests
almost exclusively on the shoulders of the attorneys, the
court, the defendant(s), and the victims. 182 To implement the
will of the Legislature in the Realignment Act, evidence based
practices must be included at the plea bargaining stage of the
proceedings.

179. California was one of the first states to judicially recognize the utility of
plea bargaining, and has developed case law in support of plea bargaining, with
limitations. See People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 604 (1970).
180. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
181. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience.
182. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
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Plea bargaining is essential to the survival of the
criminal justice system. 183
Recently, scrutiny from the
Supreme Court of the United States has generated more
attention to the details of the plea bargaining system. 184 For
example, the Court, in two recent cases explored the
competence of counsel required at the time of the plea
bargaining process. 185 In the cases of Missouri v. Frye and
Lafler v. Cooper, the majority focused on the necessity of plea
bargaining and having counsel competently performing the
duties of a dedicated attorney actively counseling the accused
on the correct law and the consequences of the actions
involved in the process. 186 The Court in Frye, pointed out that
ninety-seven percent of the federal cases filed and ninety-four
percent of all state court cases filed settle by way of pleas of
guilty or no contest. 187
In California, the statistics derived from a recent study
by John Greacen and Fredrick Miller of ten representative
counties, point to a similar statistic. 188 The study also shows
that the decisions to enter a plea of guilty or no contest is
made quite early in the proceedings on a felony, and often
before a witness is even called into the courtroom. 189
According to the study, felony cases settled at or before the
preliminary examination at a rate of over eighty percent. 190
The courts in California are furthermore interested in
and have scrutinized the plea bargaining process in terms of
183. See id.
184. See generally Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012); Frye, 132 S.
Ct. at 1408.
185. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (holding that defendant suffered prejudice
from counsel’s incompetent advice to reject a plea bargain); Frye, 132 S. Ct. at
1408 (holding that defense counsel’s failure to communicate the prosecutor’s
written plea offer to defendant satisfies requirement to show ineffective
assistance).
186. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407–08.
187. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
188. JOHN GREACEN & FREDERICK MILLER, TRIAL CERTAINTY STUDY IN
FELONY CASES, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS (2012). Available by
mail through the Administrative Office of the Courts.
189. Id. at 20.
190. Id.
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the role a judicial officer can play. 191 In the case of People v.
Clancey, 192 the Supreme Court explored the limits of judicial
intervention into the plea bargaining process. In that case,
the trial judge had given an “offer” or “indicated sentence”
over the objection of the district attorney that included the
dismissing of a strike prior, and a “top-bottom” of five
years. 193 Moreover, the judge took into account the fact that
the defendant was entering an early disposition and this was
a discounted amount of time. 194 Finally, the judge promised
that if he could not abide by the “indicated” sentence at the
time of sentencing, the defendant would have the right to
withdraw his plea. 195
There are several limits on what a judicial officer can do
in terms of resolution of cases. 196 First, the trial courts must
be restrained in the initial discussions, and allow counsel to
resolve the matter on their own. 197 Second, the court must
have and seek available information so that the judge will be
making statements grounded in solid reasons. 198 Third,
courts can “indicate” a sentence that must be consistent with
what the court would give the defendant if the case had gone
to trial. 199 Fourth, the court cannot make any inducement for
the defendant to accept the indicated sentence. 200 Finally, the
court cannot bargain with the defendant and extend the
opportunity to withdraw the plea if the court cannot accept
the disposition. 201

191. See generally People v. Clancey, 299 P.3d 131 (2012).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 134.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 136.
196. See generally id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
197. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure forbids judges from engaging
in plea bargaining discussions. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c).
198. Clancey, 299 P.3d at 138. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory
committee’s note.
199. Clancey, 299 P.3d at 138–39.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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As seen in Clancey, the court and the attorneys generally
become involved in a dialogue. 202 That dialogue usually takes
the form of the court asking if any offers have been made,
and, if so, what they are. 203 In many instances that will be
the substance of the discussion because the offer is acceptable
and a disposition is taken. 204
In more complex cases,
discussions can go on to include counter-offers by the defense,
interventions by the court to keep the discussions on track,
and may even take the form of the discussions involved in
Clancey. 205 On a felony case, the central points of contention
are usually the questions of: whether the person will be going
to prison; if so, for what amount of time; or, if not, for how
many months (days) in county jail. 206 If a “deal” is struck, it
is frequently memorialized in the record as a “top-bottom”
offer of so many years in prison or months in county jail. 207
The entire process can go forward between the attorneys, and
then, if the process is close to failing, the court can intervene
and give an indicated sentence to a defendant who pleads
guilty or no contest to all allegations. 208 This process is called
“pleading to the sheet” and the result is that the court will
impose the “indicated” sentence. The reason is that the
executive branch has control of charging. The judiciary has
control of the sentencing. 209 The court should not become
involved in dismissing charges that it has not brought. 210
With these broad features noted, the plea bargaining system,
as practiced, does not support implementation of the
Realignment Act in that ignores evidence based practices.

202. Id. at 135.
203. Based on the judge-author’s professional experience.
204. Based on the judge-author’s professional experience.
205. Clancey, 299 P.3d 131 at 135–36 and based on the judge-author’s
professional experience.
206. Based on the judge-author’s professional experience.
207. Based on the judge-author’s professional experience.
208. See generally Clancey, 299 P.3d 131.
209. People v. Tenorio, 473 P.2d 993 (1970).
210. Id. at 94
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First, attorneys and judges have had difficulty in shifting
their perceptions of what the punishment is for a person
subject to the Realignment Act. By that, it is meant that
under the pre-Realignment law, if a person entered a plea of
guilty or no contest to an offense that was punishable by state
prison, that period of time was done in prison and followed by
parole for three years. 211 Terms under the old law were
understandable, and there was a measure of control over the
defendant on release. 212
The parole term was never
calculated into the final equation at the plea bargaining
session because it was going to be another agency’s issue. 213
Now, the terms under Penal Code Section 1170(h) can be a
straight county jail sentence, or split, or blended. 214 Most
judicial officers and prosecutors think only in terms of the
custody time. 215 They are used to offering and processing
cases on straight numbers with little regard to the
community supervision aspects of the ultimate sentence. 216
For example, on a violation of burglary in the second degree,
where the defendant had been to prison two times, the triad
on the principal charge is 16 months, two years, or three
years in state prison. 217 The prison prior adds one year
each. 218 Therefore, the maximum sentence is five years
(three for the principal, plus one year each for two prison
priors). 219 Prosecutors and judicial officers are used to
dealing with an offer, at an early stage of the proceedings, of

211. Petersilia, Voices From the Field, supra note 44, at 39; ROBERT
WEISBERG & LISA T. QUAN, ASSESSING JUDICIAL SENTENCING
PREFERENCES
AFTER PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT: A SURVEY OF CALIFORNIA JUDGES 7
(2013), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/programs-andcenters/stanford-criminal-justice-center-scjc/california-realignment.
212. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 30.
213. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience.
214. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 215.
215. Id. at 140–41, 157.
216. Id.
217. CAL. PENAL CODE § 461(b).
218. Id. § 667.5(b)(1).
219. Id. §§ 461(b), 667(b)(1).
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16 months or two years. 220 The problem under Realignment
is that prosecutors and judges are still making the same type
of offers without functionally realizing that there is no parole
period. 221 The sentence will be done locally in county jail at
one-half time, but there is no monitoring done after that term
is completed. 222 This phenomena is illustrated by the charts
which show a failure to utilize the “split sentence.” 223
Moreover, the defense, in a situation where there was a
straight term of county jail under Penal Code section
1170(h)(5)(A), has no incentive to take an offer that includes a
split or blended sentence. 224 An offer which contains no
mandatory supervision under the split sentence modality is
much more agreeable than one which does because there is no
supervision, no probation officer to report, and no potential
violation of the supervision. 225 Further, the time that the
defendant would do in county jail is done on a half-time basis
due to the increase in Penal Code Section 4019. 226
In short, neither side has an incentive or reason to look
closely at the mandatory supervision model. The failure to do
so is a direct result of the adherence to the older method of
plea bargaining.
Second, a problem with this method of plea bargaining is
that it completely eviscerates the sound procedure of
evidence-based practices. As stated before, this type of
process would include an assessment of the defendant. This
assessment would be available to both sides.
This
information would be used to assess the risk and needs of the
defendant. A suggested custody component would be usually
recommended, and most importantly, the “treatment”
component could be suggested well before the actual plea
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience.
Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 158–59.
Id. at 155.
See supra Figure 2.
Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 140–41.
Id.
Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 4019.
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discussions were commenced. Without this vital component
being utilized at the beginning of the process, challenges to
Realignment will be present.
There are many obstacles present that potentially impede
progress. 227 There are also many positive influences that may
overcome the impediments. In some jurisdictions, probation
officers regularly sit in on plea discussions. 228 There are also
concerns that certain Fifth Amendment rights could be
compromised, though these can be resolved by certain
protective orders which shield the defendant’s comments. 229
Finally, the looming shadow of jail overcrowding may
cast a pall over the entire process of plea bargaining in the
Realignment age. 230 Currently, a number of county jails are
subject to “jail caps” from federal courts. 231 These caps, as
well as self-imposed caps in the more rural counties, have
caused a furor with the Realignment process because local
officials, rightly or wrongly, have blamed the state for
dumping prisoners back on to the county bed space and
coffers without adequate funding or resources. 232
The
consequence of the “caps” with no funding is that county jails,
in some jurisdictions are releasing sentenced prisoners
without any supervision. 233 This throwing up of their hands
causes the entire Realignment Act to be viewed with
disrespect.
This feature, in turn, may cause a wave of cynicism
regarding plea bargaining in this new era. The reason is that
many prosecutors and judicial officers see the early release of
227. See generally Petersilia, Voices from the Fields, supra note 44.
228. For example, Santa Clara County has had probation officers regularly
sit in on early disposition calendars for approximately 25 years.
229. The City and County of San Francisco Probation Department
collaboratively developed a protective order for this type of in depth interview so
that the results would not be admissible in court prior to sentencing. District
Attorney, Public Defender and Private counsel have signed off on the protocol
implementing this process.
230. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 92–95, 117–18.
231. Id. at 134
232. Id. at 4.
233. Id. at 9.
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sentenced prisoners as a violation of their powers, causing the
criminal justice system to be held in disrepute. 234 Therefore,
because there is no state level option for many convicted
felons, and the custody time must be served in a local facility,
and that facility is full, others are released to make room for
the newly committed or the newly committed are taken in
and released within days. 235
V. CHALLENGES OF THE REVOCATION PROCESS
The revocations of post-release community supervision
(PRCS) and mandatory supervision are often an overlooked
area of the transition into Realignment. Courts have never
previously dealt with the issues presented by these
revocations because they are new creatures of the
Realignment Act. The only comparative experience county
courts have is limited to probation violation matters. With
the advent of two new methods of community supervision,
new challenges emerge.
Realignment requires the use of evidence-based practices
for the revocation of both PRCS and mandatory
supervision. 236 When there is a technical violation of the
release, escalating sanctions are to be utilized, such as a
residential program for a substance abuser who has tested
dirty, or “flash incarceration” (brief incarceration) if there was
a failure to report to the supervision office. 237 When the
person being supervised commits a new criminal offense,
there is a separate track for the court and probation
department to follow and revocation may occur once the
errant behavior is documented, in a factual manner, in a
petition for revocation. 238 Under the Realignment Act, once a
violation is proven in court, the sentencing court has three

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 131, 158.
Id. at 78.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3453, 17.5.
Id.
Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 39–40.
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options to follow:
Modify the conditions of release, including perhaps some
additional custody time;
Revoke supervision in its entirety and sentence the
defendant to 180 days in county jail (In the case of mandatory
supervision, the court maintains the right to impose the
balance of the un-served sentence originally imposed.); or
Refer the defendant to a re-entry court, which specializes
in helping offenders transition back into society (“re-enter”)
successfully while being in compliance with the terms of their
supervision. 239
The overall success of the Realignment Act is primarily
vested with the flexibility, innovation, and dedication of the
local probation departments. Before the Realignment Act
actually went into effect, most probation departments
planned for action with strategies for handling the new
obligations proscribed by the Act. 240 The obligations involved
the convening of the Community Corrections Partnership,
sorting out the members of this planning group, and
implementing a plan for the local community consistent with
the goals and objectives of the Act. 241 It also meant a change
within the probation departments because, as of October 1,
2011, they would be responsible for the community
supervision of those offenders who were released from
prison. 242 Heretofore, these persons were on parole and an
obligation of the state. 243 In lieu of state parole, the “nons”
would be supervised by “High Risk Offender” units in the
probation department. 244 The supervised individuals were
239. Id.
240. Id. at 196. For example, the Santa Clara County Probation Department
assigned deputy probation officers to conference with those to be released on
Postrelease Community Supervision in advance of their release, so that they
would a clearer understanding of their obligations and the supervisee assessed
to plan the program ahead of the release date, rather than after.
241. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(1)–(2).
242. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 39–40.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 201–02.
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the non-violent, non-serious, non-registerable under Penal
Code Section 290, and non-aggravated white-collar offenders
who would have transitioned to release. 245 They are on threeyear terms of PRCS. 246
To anticipate this process, probation departments, and
sheriff offices needed to respond methodically.
After
garnering a statistical overview of what numbers they were to
expect, they started to shift into the programmatic phase
which included training probation officers to participate in
motivational interviewing, setting up a validated assessment
tool, and working to establish cognitive behavioral therapy. 247
The sheriff offices, many of whom operate under courtordered caps on population, braced for the onslaught of new
persons into their facilities. 248 Generally, there were feelings
of great trepidation about the numbers which would be
faced. 249
Against this backdrop, courts were obligated to institute
new procedures for the revocation process. A “hearing officer”
needed to be designated. 250 New forms, with the assistance of
the Judicial Council, were created, along with Rules of
Court. 251 New procedures within individual courts were
established so that timely rulings could be had on
preliminary revocations. 252 New calendars were established
245. Id. at 37–39.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 15.
248. Id. at 82.
249. Id. at 175–78.
250. CAL. GOV. CODE § 71622.5.
251. CAL. CT. R. 4.540, & 4.541.
252. Revocations of parole, probation, post-release community supervision
and mandatory supervision are controlled by California Penal Code section
1203.2. This section provides that the hearings should be held in a “reasonable”
amount of time. The concern was that the initial ruling from the federal court
in the case of Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger,599 F. 3d 984, 995 (2010) required a
strict timeline for the probable cause determination and the hearing dates. In
June 2013, Judge Karlton of the Eastern District of California dismissed the
action because it lacked standing under the “case or controversy” requirement
for federal jurisdiction. The court found that the Realignment Act, and
specifically, the provisions of California Penal Code section 1203.2 superseded
the initial ruling he had made, which had stringent, specific deadlines for the
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so that the violations could be monitored effectively.253
All of the foregoing was done statewide with an eye towards
the money available to the local jurisdictions. Since money
was one of the primary factors leading to the Legislative and
gubernatorial decision-making on Realignment, and because
the Legislature had granted local jurisdictions the passthrough money to support the effort, the process for the
division of funds lay in the hands of the Community
Correctional Partnership. 254 Composition of the CCP was
dictated by statute to encompass all of the criminal justice
partners, including the presiding judge of the local superior
court. Because of ethics opinions and the option included in
the statute of having a representative of the judges act as the
representative of the courts, most judicial officers declined to
participate.
Court executives substituted for judicial
participation.
Implementation of the Realignment Act,
therefore, was designed to have fifty-eight different plans
based on the local needs of each county. Some counties opted
for more jail construction. 255 Others innovatively partnered
between the sheriff’s office and local probation departments
to create reentry centers designed to move sentenced
prisoners into the treatment mode prior to release with
panoply of services designed to meet individual needs based
on results from assessments done prior to going into
custody. 256
The foregoing information is helpful in gaining a full
understanding of the processes used for revocation of either
PRCS or mandatory supervision. It has become clear that the
persons transferred under the Realignment Act are now a
community responsibility. The degree to which this has
permeated local thinking is an open question.

commencement of hearings on revocation of parole.
253. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 150.
254. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(1)–(2).
255. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 164.
256. Id. at 197–98.
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The first open question is the degree to which the local
probation department is committed to the process. Many
probation officers seek to supplement the role of law
enforcement officers, but also to assure compliance of the
supervised person. 257 This theory of supervision often places
the supervised person in an adversarial position with
probation officer. Other probation officers have adopted the
wait-and-see approach, which gives the supervised person as
much rope needed to hang him or her self. The final group is
the probation officer who is an active interventionist, who
becomes involved in the plan of rehabilitation.
All of these models of supervision do not bode well for the
success of Realignment. While the foregoing may seem
simplistic, the judicial perception of each is valid. The reason
for the pessimism is that as to the person on Post-Release
Community Supervision, they have been institutionalized and
are coming out into a world that is markedly different that
what they learned inside of the prison. The supervised
persons believed that they would have parole agents, who
were overworked, and if they violated, they would get a
number of months and go about their business. 258 The key to
re-integrating the offender—particularly after a violation of
release—may be judicial intervention by way of review every
thirty, sixty, or ninety days to guarantee that the offender is
sticking with the rehabilitative program. 259
The judicial officer at the arraignment for the violation of
post-release community supervision and mandatory
supervision has to make critical decisions. This readjustment
of the sentencing process will succeed or fail based on the
ability of the hearing officer to make critical triage decisions.
Some of the daunting factors presented at the hearing are:

257. Id. at 196–98.
258. Id. at 9–10.
259. Marlowe, supra note 142, 183–201.
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• Whether the defendant has relapsed into addict
behavior.
• Whether the defendant is suffering from a hitherto
undisclosed mental illness, which is now florid.
•Whether the defendant has continued to abuse
substances.
•Whether the defendant was committed on an offense
that did not include gang affiliations, and now the
defendant is with a gang.
•Whether the defendant committed a technical
violation.
•Whether the defendant has a new case pending.260
Each of these scenarios presents a challenge to the
hearing officer who must address each based on the
background, the assessment, and prospects of the defendant.
There are requirements which probation officers must
meet prior to the filing of the formal petition for revocation of
either status. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule
4.541, the probation officer is required to spell out in detail
why intermediate sanctions have failed and why the petition
is necessary. Preceding a petition, the probation officer might
place a person in residential treatment for substance abuse
offenders, and it might mean moving a defendant into a
program of psychological therapy.
After the petition is filed, a defendant has the full
panoply of constitutional Due Process rights once the process
of revocation is pursued. Once arraigned, few choose to
exercise those rights and go to a full hearing on the truth of
260. See CAL. CT. R. 4.541(c)(1)–(4).
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the violation. In many jurisdictions, the violation calendar is
using a model similar to a drug court. 261 This collaborative
model requires that the probation officer, the district
attorney, and the defense counsel meet with the hearing
officer prior to the formal court hearing. 262 Each defendant is
discussed, and decisions are made in terms that are the best
decision available at the time. 263 For example, in many
situations defendants simply abscond and are not available.
Warrants issue and are dealt with at the next hearing after
the time period is tolled. 264 In others, the defendant may
have simply failed a urine test, and a higher degree of
rehabilitation is ordered and the defendant is seeking same.
For some, the ninety days of incarceration is not a challenge,
and they accept it without any further penalty other than
reinstatement of the original order of three years of release
less the time they have done.
There are many instances where the decision process is
not so simple.
First, there is the use of intermediate sanctions. Some
jurisdictions are requiring that if there is no new law
violation, the probation department must utilize its best
efforts to not file a petition and seek reasonable intermediate
sanctions. 265 A model that was picked up from the HOPE
program in Hawaii, is “flash incarceration” (Penal Code
Section 3455). 266 Judicial intervention in this process is the
key. 267 Under the California law, no court appearance or
261. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 172–76 (noting the
use of intermediate sanctions as a key feature of Realignment. This model
requires frequent reviews and is as done in drug courts).
262. Id. at 135.
263. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience.
264. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(a); Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra
note 44, at 175.
265. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 173.
266. See generally ANGELA HARKEN & MARK KLEIMAN, MANAGING DRUG
INVOLVED PROBATIONERS WITH SWIFT AND CERTAIN SANCTIONS: EVALUATING
HAWAII’S HOPE, (Dec. 2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/229023.pdf.
267. See Steve Lopez, Hawaii Finds Success with Tough-Love Approach to
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judicial intervention is required. 268 A probation officer can
handcuff and surrender the defendant to the jail without any
judicial finding of any type of violation. While this is the law,
the wisdom of this process, on two levels, is questionable.
This process sets up an unneeded adversarial relationship
which is contrary to the building of a relationship which will
foster a decline in recidivism. The perception is that the
probation officer is the police officer and there to incarcerate
him/her and not to work through any issues. Moreover, and
leaving aside the Due Process aspects of incarceration
without judicial intervention, the probation departments are
missing an opportunity to have a person in a black robe
evaluate the sanction while they remain only as a person
providing information to the court.
Second, there is the issue of whether intermediate
sanctions have really been utilized. Many of the petitions
seen by judicial officers are bereft of creativity. Granted,
many offenders are completely recalcitrant; however, this Act
was designed to compel probation officers to work with and
manage an offender population at a local level. The ratio of
offender to officer has been scaled back to permit active
intervention, yet many petitions fail to point to those kind of
solutions to fit the offender’s issues. For example, an offender
with an extensive history of mental health issues fails to
report or take a urine test. Is a proper result a flash
incarceration or referring the individual to services with
strict monitoring? Judicial officers also have a stake in this:
if there is an intermediate sanction short of revocation,
should not the judicial officer be involved in reviews?
Third, the sanction to which an accused PRCS violator is
exposed does not comport with the common sense and
Repeat Offenders, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/
dec/01/local/la-me-1202-lopez-probation-20121202. See also WASH. DEP’T OF
CORR., COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PRACTICES 4–5 (2012), available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/documents/legislature/ReportsToTheLegislature/2012%2
06204%20Report_d061929d-8b53-4158-9aa6-3db530673e22.pdf.
268. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3455.
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experience of many judicial officers. Most judicial officers are
used to dealing with probation violations. In that arena, if
the accused violator is found in violation, the probation is
revoked, and the offender is sentenced to state prison for the
term available under the law, which may be very steep.
There are, thus, real consequences for the violation.
In the new era of post-Realignment law, the offender who
violates PRCS is subject only to six months of custody time,
done on a one-half time basis because of the new credit
system. For some offenders, ninety days is inconsequential;
the defendant knows it, the defense attorney knows it, the
court knows it, and the district attorney is too painfully
aware of it. This unique situation may require a small
amount of history, which is based on anecdotal facts rather
than hard facts.
One aspect of the economic issues facing the State of
California in the last years leading to Realignment was the
amount of money the State was spending for the housing of
persons who had violated parole. Not only were some
offenders returned to the prison, at the increased costs
discussed infra, but a majority were housed in local county
jails paid by the State per bed used. Excluding the new law
violations, violations may have stemmed for the simple
failure to report to one’s supervising officer, or a dirty drug
test. The costs were staggering.
In the new era, the critical feature is the challenge of
having criminal justice personnel, judges included, adapt to
the fact that violations will occur and the penalty is not that
severe for a majority of the offenders. The next step is
realizing that the persistent drum beat of assessment—to
determine the actual cause of what brings the offender into
the system and select the best treatment program—is the key
to both public safety and cutting recidivism.
A final challenge in the revocation area is reserved for
those alleged to have violated Mandatory Supervision. In the
initial Act, no provisions were enacted to account for the
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revocation of Mandatory Supervision. In clean up legislation,
all revocation processes, including parole, which became a
responsibility of local jurisdictions as of July 1, 2013, are
covered by Penal Code Section 1203.2. 269 Little, if any,
thought has been given to the dynamics of the Mandatory
Supervision process. One might wonder if this category is
simply a placeholder for the inevitable conclusion that the
court should simply grant probation, forego the prison prior
that is available and work with the defendant as a
probationer. If it is not, a realistic programmatic change
needs to be available to all of those in the system. The
Legislature may have to explore methods of extending the
period of supervision in order to meet the requirement of
Evidence Based Practices. More thought and discussion
among all of the justice partners is needed to overcome this
judicial quandary.
CONCLUSION
One key paradigm emerges from the Realignment: local
jurisdictions have to take responsibility, ownership, and care
for those who are designated offenders. No longer can
counties transport the low level offenders to remote stretches
of the state for a designated period of time and then, after
that period, fail to integrate them back into society. This
legislation, in its long-term reach, aims at keeping the lowlevel offender in the community under supervision, and to
reintegrate the person back into a productive life through
programs and treatment, largely geared to address substance
abuse, addiction, and mental illness. These key ingredients
commonly plague low-level offenders and local programs offer
the best resource for success, so long as there are funds and
the proper philosophical bent. The twin goals of public safety
and reduction of recidivism are the hallmarks, which will be
tested and examined both qualitatively and quantitatively.
269. S.B. 1023, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
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In many respects, the success or failure of the
Realignment Act rests not on the pronouncements of the
bench officer, but the day-to-day work done by the justice
partners who must deal with enforcing conditions of release,
managing re-entry programs, and keeping a conscientious eye
on daily bed counts in county jails. The unique structure of
the Realignment Act in requiring every county to have the
Community Correction Partnership with all justice partners
is an investment in shared goals. The collective wisdom of
these individuals will determine success.
The cumulative data suggests there are some executional
hiccups hindering Realignment’s success.
Community
270
Corrections Partnerships
in each county are supposed to
carry out countywide Realignment strategies, but many of
them fail to delineate specific goals 271 that would help the
various actors involved channel their efforts and make likeminded decisions around evidence-based practices.
Several affirmative solutions are apparent from
experience and the available data.
First, judges and attorneys participating in the plea
bargaining process on the targeted offenders must re-evaluate
their positions in the system. On a strict reading of Clancey,
supra, courts are required to have as much information as
possible before a decision is made to “indicate” a sentence.
This is an opportunity to utilize evidence-based practices and
obtain an assessment at the front end of the process. It poses
a unique opportunity to enforce the will of the Legislature
and fashion a resolution that will be more meaningful than
pre- Realignment sentences.

270. Community Correction Partnerships (CCPs) include (at least)
representatives from the police, the sheriff, the district attorney, the public
defender, the superior court, and social services.
271. Community Correction Partnership Plans, CAL. BD. OF STATE & CMTY.
CORR.,
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/board/realignment-resources/communitycorrections-partnership-plans (collecting county CCP plans for fiscal years 2011
through 2014).
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Second, all phases of the criminal justice system must be
educated in the background of, use of, and processes involved
with the evidence-based practices. While the probation
departments and judicial branch have gone to great lengths
to educate, continued varied forms of education, done on a
continuous basis need to be done with those involved with law
enforcement, jail management and, perhaps most
importantly, the prosecutors and defense bar. When a system
has been operating the same way for over twenty years, any
change is difficult. Only through further education will this
process become fully vested.
Third, the entire process of mandatory supervision and
straight time sentencing under Penal Code Sections 1170(h)
needs to be re-examined. The intent was to shift prison time
back to the jails. Credit-for-time-served formulas were done
in an attempt to cut into the actual amount of days spent in
jail, so that overcrowding would be a target for law suits
locally. Early release programs by some counties have been
the standard. Either the Legislature must provide for some
period of time after the sentence on supervision, outside of
the term in county jail, or must determine whether local
sentences in lieu of state prison should be abolished all
together. In other words, the Legislature must determine
whether they can order local courts not to send any of the low
level offenders to prison ever. The reasoning is simple: to
enforce evidence-based practices, time is needed. The split or
blended sentence, in most instances, provides inadequate
time for this process to take place. It is a hollow promise to
both society at large and the offender in particular that
recidivism will be reduced without this needed time. A grant
of probation, up to five years with a jail sentence offers much
greater opportunity to both.
Finally, the state must continue to financially support all
of these efforts. One can harken back to promise made in the
1970’s regarding the shut down of state mental hospitals and
the hope that local programs would do more good. The
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hospitals closed, but so did the state support. This cannot
happen when the issue of public safety is at stake. The first
years of Realignment disclosed the use of funds for hiring new
jail officers, new probation officers and staffing courts. The
next years must be dedicated to the use of the funds for the
programs.

